The Role of History in IR Theoretical framework: to create an institution

By Araya Kebede Araya*

The Role of History in IR Theoretical framework: to create an institution[1]

  

Does history matter in international relations? If history matters, why and how does it matter? This essay explains logically the way historical narratives can be main resources of international relations theoretical framework. For example, how norms, ideas or identities create institutions as an outcome of rational design and make them work even without specific organizations, committees or representative systems.

The main point is all about assimilation of or narrowing the gap between rational/positive knowledge (as relevance of history is asked) and normative knowledge (as roles of norms, ideas and identities is asked) so as to have a rational but at the same time appropriate result. As a result of the process and an ultimate outcome of rational design, how norms, ideas and identities are employed so as to have a self-sufficient institution that does not essentially require specific organizations, committees or representative systems.

Does history matter? How far can it travel?

Having the merit of ‘LOGIC OF CONSEQUENCES thinking’ in mind, I would answer the question, if history matters in international relations, to the affirmative.  However, reliance only on history takes us no where. It can only provide us with part of the required KNOWLEDGE to better explain the international system. As Alexander Wendt rightly put it in his article entitled ‘Driving with Rearview Mirror: On the Rational Science of Institutional Design’ (P.1020), while he doubts if rationality can tell us everything, he certainly thinks it can tell us a lot.    

 The process of rational design results in institutions - designs. The theory of rational design is that states and other actors choose international institutions to further their own interests. (Snidal, Koremenos, Lipson - quoted in Wendt P. 1020) What kinds of interests? What if the rationally chosen interests are immoral, self-destructive, etc? If the driving forces within this institution designing process are ideas, norms and identities, would the common interests the actors pursuing be different? Do we have “RULES OF RECOGNITION” for the interests?

Yes, the standards are the would-be normatively carved principles. The (rational) choice will be appropriate as it is a result of practical knowledge and not only that of explanatory knowledge. The rational design should not be attractive to some and not to others. It has to be equally favoring to members and, even, to non-members. Wendt on this score: ‘If for a single actor rational action is what subjectively maximizes its interests, then when there are multiple actors, as in international politics, a rationally chosen institution will be one that solves their collective-action (but still one-sided) problem, not one that necessarily solves a problem in the external world.’ (P.1023, Emphasis supplied) Once it is able to solve any problem, including the external world’s ones, the implication is that the collective-action problems are no more subjectively understood rather determined by OBJECTIVE facts in the world. The solution will also be in line with the reality.

       

 Hence, the economics theory of rational expectations: that the expected consequences of design choices will generally correspond to the actual ones. Mitchell and Keilbatch coin a term for this i.e., compliance to ‘the structure of the situation’. Moreover, the problems are constructed by a communicative process of interpreting what that world means and how and why designers should care about it. (Kratochwil, 1989). This analysis takes us to the part of the essay’s issue – institutions working without organs. (The discussion is taken up in the last section of this essay – argument based on Constitutional Structure.)

Historical examples on norms changing actors’ behaviors

There are several historical incidents whereby the LOGIC OF APPROPRIATENESS (judgment of right or wrong) supersedes that of logic of consequences or cost-benefit calculation. Some example are the ‘nuclear taboo’ where nuclear was not used in Vietnam War despite compelling situations and U.S.’ refraining from conquering the Bahamas, that landlocked states have a say on the Law of the Sea, Luxembourg votes in the EU, inclusion of Russia in G-8, no exemption for murder in the human rights regime, etc (Tennenwald 1999, Wendt, 1999, Mitchell and Kilbach, 2001). According to the authors, all happenstances occurred due to normative grounds. How? As actors become socialized to norms, they make them part of their identity, and that identity in turn creates a collective interest in norms as ends in themselves. Do such norms fulfill actors’ interest? Not necessarily so. Such actors follow the norms not because it is in their self-interest, but it is intrinsically the RIGHT or GOOD thing to do in their society. (More on level of identities required, please see below)

      

It is important to observe the pervasive nature of norms. There is widely accepted argument in international law whether international law is really a law since we observe many violations and there is no international compulsory legislature, police and court. The argument proponents advise us not to focus on the few violations or non-performance of treaties. The untold, unheard observances of treaties (which are not news so we cannot hear them usually) comprise the largest share of the discipline.  This branch of law is widely respected due to the logic of consequences and largely due to the logic of appropriateness. To borrow Wendt’s statement, ‘society would not be as stable as it is if people always applied [only] logic of consequences to their actions, and so international norms may explain much of the rule-following we see in international life. (Id. P. 1025)  

Why history matters

History (historical or explanatory knowledge) matters as it can explain the past which in turn, if effectively employed, can be used to predict the future. The problem is that it does not provide with complete account of the required knowledge to set an all encompassing theoretical framework of IR theory. The knowledge required is one that can pass the tests of time and space.   Therefore, we can appreciate history’s contribution while taking note of its insufficiency. So what is the remedy?

The remedy

The remedy is we need also practical knowledge to buttress the explanatory one. Institutional designers need making or practical knowledge – a knowledge about what to do on top of the incomplete explanatory knowledge. As Henry Jackman concisely put it, ‘we live forwards but understand backwards’. (In Wendt, ibid) But the ‘forwards’ cannot be reduced to that of ‘backwards’. Knowing about the history or why we acted in the past can teach us valuable lessons but past is only conditionally related to the future unless we believe in determinism.

          

For Example, whether actors preserve an existing institution like state sovereignty or design a new one like the EU is up to them. Here relies the very point where the past cannot provide us with. Put it in other ways, the voluntarism inherent in this question is something that positive social science (for our purpose here, history) is not well-equipped to handle but norms can. Even such norms need to create a reasonably good level of common identities and interests amongst the possible actors too bring them together to think about institutions that can solve common and collective problems.

Level of collective identity required

In the process of creating an institution, in addition to historical knowledge and ideas and norms; there is one more element that has to be fulfilled: collective identity. How states come to see ‘institutions as a solution’ to collective-action problems? We might point to the norms of international society as a prerequisite such that it is only with the attainment of a certain level of collective identity that the rational design of institutions becomes possible.  (Hadley Bull on Wendt’s, 1999; emphasis supplied)

Enabling institutions to run on their own

The theoretical explanation is that norms, ideas and identities once well established they do not need any other pillar to help them function. They do not need committee, organization or special representative. They are self-sufficient. The way they are created makes them so. The end result is, therefore, strong enough to hold every actor and action in place. There is no way back as all involved are already in an appropriate outcome.   

           

Here, I think, C. Reus-Smit’s Constitutional Structures comes to the fore. Once actors build Constitutional Structures of meta-values defining legitimate statehood and rightful state action, institutions can run on their own as the Structure incorporates hegemonic beliefs about the moral purpose of the state, the organizing principle of sovereignty, and norms of pure procedural justice. (pp. 559, 567) This strong hold of Constitutional Structure characterizes fundamental institutions which in turn define issue specific regimes or institutions.

Conclusion

Although sociological (identities) and constructivist (norms and ideas) approaches seem in contradiction to rational design theory in the process of institution creation, they in fact are complementary in the sense that they ‘could refer to explanations that do not contradict rational-design theory but imbed it within broader social or historical  contexts that construct its elements (preferences, beliefs and so on).

       

 It is about bringing about consequentialism and normative knowledge together. It is about how the logic of appropriateness may help structure international institutions designed by rational actors so that the end result will be right. If norms and ideas are to bring about similar identities and interests, even actors will go for their best interests; they will ultimately be questing similar interests. Hence, logic of consequences and logic of appropriateness complement one another. This is the possible place where rational choice and norm meet in the process of designing an institution.

Araya Kebede Araya, LL B., MA, LL. M (PROLAW)

Lecturer in Law, Mekelle University, College of Law and Governance

Ethiopia, Mekelle - Adi Haqi Campus

Cell phone: +39 3896872473 (Rome, Italy), +251 923 771883 (Ethiopia)

E-mail: araya57k@gmail.com, aaraya@luc.edu

Blog: http://lawfordevelopment.blogspot.com/

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[1] The question for this essay is framed by my instructor and adviser Dr Ham, Jilin University – Institute of International Studies  

On Building New IR Theories explaining interactions within a region

By Araya Kebede Araya*

On Building New IR Theories explaining interactions within a region

Since the advent of the post-Cold War period, the field of international relations has witnessed the opportunity to build up new IR theories as a way to explain political interaction embedded in and constructed among states within the context of specific regions.[1]

Several authors argue in different ways why a certain theory or thinking can work in one region. For example, while Ross propagates geography as a special feature that explains why China but not Russia and Japan can be a great power in the East Asian region and even beyond but within Asia; Robert Uriu excellently articulates, how export-led economy can (as much as Democratic Peace Theory (DPT) does) brings peace in the East Asia region. In what follows, these two – geography and export-led, Brantley Womack’s Asymmetry, and David Kang’s Hierarchy are discussed in a way to attempt the essay question.    

Let’s begin with the theory of Asymmetry of Brantley Womack. In his article entitled Asymmetry theory and China’s concept of Multipolarity, Womack wrote that contrary to Western theories of realism and neo-realism, more powerful countries usually cannot impose their will on less powerful countries. There is instead a relatively stable matrix of international relationships in which exchanges may not be equal, but they are usually negotiated on the basis of autonomy of both sides. (P.10) Stronger powers have opportunities and responsibilities for leadership in these matrices, but if they dominate the international order for the sake of their narrow interests, they will put at risk their long-term prominence. As we will see it in the immediately second paragraph, this is what is exactly happening with China’s relations with smaller, weaker countries. It is also in sharp contrast with what Realism dictates that weaker states will try to ally and balance the larger one. Asymmetry theory says not necessarily so.  

However, in every asymmetric situation the stronger state needs to be confident of the deference of the weaker state. By deference he does not mean that the weaker state obeys the stronger, but that the weaker state acts in accordance with the reality of the disparity between them. (Id. P.11) On the other side, the weaker state needs to be confident that the stronger state respects its autonomy. In a normal, peaceful relationship, autonomy and deference can coexist.

This theory effectively explains the relationship between China and Southeast Asia region. As he demonstrates in another article, this theory predicts different results from what Structural Realists do in explaining the relationship between China and Southeast Asian countries. The larger power, here China, has a particular responsibility for leadership because the smaller powers are at risk and therefore the larger power has their full attention. China has some advantages in its role of regional leadership because of its imperial tradition, its own status as a victim of larger powers, its retreat from revolutionary politics, and its reform era emphasis on peaceful economic cooperation. As a result, China’s increasing prominence in regional trade, investment and tourism is treated by Southeast Asia as a challenge of how to engage China rather than of how to protect itself from China. (pp. 529, 531)    

I think that this asymmetrical relationship is also being reflected in the multifaceted relationship between China and African countries. In fact, Womack claims the current order of nations in the world—as asymmetric as their capacities may be—is in reality quite stable. (p.11) Asymmetrical relationship, however, has to be managed in terms of minimizing potentially hot issues and controlling the escalation of misperceptions (which is amongst the normal consequences of asymmetry) for the ultimate purpose of maximizing mutual benefits.  

A reading by David Kang sees a Chinese centered peaceful hierarchical East Asia as a result of, though not necessarily exclusive to, culture and norm. (P.183) Yes, hierarchy explains East Asia that is unthinkable in other regions during this period, at least, as far as there is no study conducted on the score. He said a hierarchic view would predict that the Asian states see China’s central place in the regional system as inevitable, and have strategies for adjusting to China without provoking it. In addition, China will act within bounds that are acceptable to the other Asian nations. While making his point, he has discussed each and every China’s neighbors with Beijing’s relations with sufficient detail.

This scenario has important implications, in addition to the region per se, to world politics. For example, it predicts U.S. – China relations. Based on the above explanation, U.S. will not try to form a balancing coalition against the rising China as otherwise it would be counterproductive to itself. Contrary to what many scholars would predict, he said, Asian nations may not prefer the U.S. to China if they are forced to choose one.

  

In this connection, if the U.S. pulls out, he conditioned (Ibid), a hierarchical view would predict that China would take a greater role in organizing the system, and Vietnam, Japan, and Korea adjust, with order preserved. Unlike what the other school of thought, Realism, predicts; the U.S. withdrawal is not nearly so destabilizing for Japan in a hierarchic system. He has explained his statements in his optimistic article. In effect, he concludes that Japan may not rearm following U.S. withdrawal as the former has nothing to fear about China as both know and respect each other’s place.         

According to Robert Ross, geography can be a determinant factor in order for a certain country to be a great power or, at least, a regional power. In some regions, there may not be a regional power as almost all the countries in that region are of similar feature. But in some others, he argues geography has a big impact in determining so. He thoroughly discusses in his article how China and the US but neither Russian nor Japan (could have been candidates of the region) can be in the pole of regional power. And it is all about geography i.e., evolving strategic capabilities like natural and demographic resources to sustain economic development and strategic autonomy with many implications like export led market. (pp. 4 (83) ff)    

How about the export-led development that results in creating peaceful region? Robert Uriu (pp.150-3) contends that the special Asian oriented export-led peace can exclusively explain the existence of prolonged peace amongst the neighbors. It seems persuasive enough to say export-led economies effectively maintain peace for the sake of their international or regional trade and not necessarily because they are democratic regimes. The point is that Asia may include a fair number of countries that are not democratic, but almost all of its countries, including most of those that are not democratic, rely heavily on trade amongst each other. Therefore, although we cannot explain the region’s peace with DPT, we can safely employ the export-led one since Asian nations became more and more focused on exports. The segments of their economy connected to the world economy became powerful constituencies favoring peaceful foreign policies. He suggests that all of this tremendous focus on exports (and international economic exchange more broadly) has turned Asia and particularly East Asia into a “zone of amity” although North Korea, which exports almost nothing and has no economic stake in getting along with its neighbors, is there. (Id. P.156)  

In sum, taking the above theories and other possible equivalents it is reasonable to conclude that the field of international relations has the opportunity to build up new IR theories as a way to explain political interaction embedded in and constructed among states within the context of specific regions.

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Araya Kebede Araya, LL B., MA, LL. M (PROLAW)

Lecturer in Law, Mekelle University, College of Law and Governance

Ethiopia, Mekelle - Adi Haqi Campus

Cell phone: +39 3896872473 (Rome, Italy), +251 923 771883 (Ethiopia)

E-mail: araya57k@gmail.com, aaraya@luc.edu

Blog: http://lawfordevelopment.blogspot.com/

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[1] The question for the essay has been framed by my instructor and adviser Dr Ham, an instructor in Jilin University, Institute of International Studies.

Chinese Image in Ethiopia, Africa: Imperialists?

By Araya Kebede Araya*

Chinese Image in Ethiopia, Africa: Imperialists?

  “China has been pursuing an independent foreign policy of peace, and observing the purposes of the UN Charter and the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence in handling its relations with all the countries in the world, including African countries. Based on these guidelines, we have provided development assistance to Africa to the best of our capacity, which is genuine, selfless and transparent. We support Africa for its democratization and judicial building, but as China never accepts any foreign country to impose its will on China, we will never impose our own will on African countries.”

                                                    Chinese Ambassador to Ethiopia, Mr. Lin Lin 

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Introduction

Imperialism is a policy of systematic domination and exploitation of a country or an empire. It is the policy of extending a nation’s authority by territorial acquisition or by the establishment of economic and political hegemony over other nations as has been the trend being utterly followed by virtually all Western countries against the rest of the world until recently. Is China exercising it now over African countries?    

The overall interaction between China and Africa that had attracted attentions of academicians, politicians and the media at large had led to different interpretations. The varying views can roughly be grouped either into (1) mutual support or (2) seeking a disguised neo-colonialist adventure.

The first three decades of their interactions was characterized by reciprocal assistance reflected in terms of China’s support to African countries in their struggles for independence, anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism, and African countries support to China’s drive for recognition and representation at the United Nations Organization. (Ketema, 2009) So, is the country once helping African countries on their fight against independence, anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism exercising imperialism of its own way?

China repeating Western legacy in Africa?

There are more than few voices which allege that China is a pursuing a neo-colonialist policy, just repeating what the Europeans were doing, buying up cheap resources and selling higher-priced manufactured goods.

An article by Carmody and Omusu entitled Competing Hegemons? Chinese versus American geo-economic strategies in Africa, published in Political Geography 26 (2007) investigates the nature of Chinese and American investment and trade in Africa; the ways in which these governments view the continent, and explores the economic and political impacts of enhanced geo-economic competition between the West and the East there. This research claims to have found that current trends are reworking the colonial trade structure, strengthening authoritarian states, and fuelling conflict. However, there are also progressive dimensions to the current conjuncture which could be improved on with more robust international coordination and action.

While the revival of economic growth which this has brought to the continent is potentially progressive in its impacts, it has largely been confined to enclaves, and upper classes state elites. Also, while the international community has played a vital role in ending wars in Liberia, Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo, among others; oil investment has fuelled local conflict and made many states less accountable to their populations.

Chinese practices in Africa represents ‘‘business as usual,’’ rather than a radical break with the past (Klare & Volman, 2006). Because of state involvement, Chinese companies are better positioned to make short-term losses for long-term gains. For instance, the representative of China’s state-owned construction company in Ethiopia revealed that it was instructed to bid low on tenders, without regard to profit, and China’s largest telecoms manufacturer gifted equipment to Telkom Kenya (Lyman, 2005). However, China is merely following a very traditional path established by Europe, Japan and the United States: offering poor countries comprehensive and exploitative trade deals combined with aid’’ (Pan, 2006).

Chinese companies have other competitive advantages too in that they are often willing to pay bribes and under-the-counter signing bonuses (Catholic Relief Services, 2003). While this was a standard practice in the past, China is now seen to be creating a ‘‘neo-imperialistic dynamic in the hemisphere’’ and by displacing domestic manufacturers through imports, possibly deepening class disparities and corruption. Africa has recently been hit with a Chinese ‘‘Textile tsunami’’ (Asia News, 2004)

While the influx of Chinese capital might be attractive, Adama Gaye, a Senegalese author and commentator (China-Africa: The Dragon and the Ostrich, 2006) warns that China knows what it wants from Africa and "has come with a strategy." Africa, on the contrary, he believes, has not done the same homework. There is no strategic continental approach that African countries have adopted. No think tank, no task force, no inclusion of Chinese language into universities, no coordinated approach. Finally he proposes that this should be the role of the African Union. The question, indeed, is what is Africa doing in the face of these challenges? Nothing! It's as if African countries are rushing to China, bowl in hand. And China naturally is in its best position to take advantage, whereas African countries are almost powerless and just expecting China to be the new messiah.

Gaye compares the renewed global interest in Africa's raw materials and markets with suitors lining up to court the continent. China, hungry for all the natural resources it can get, is determined to win Africa's hand, he says. China is in a position to be in the heart of Africa. And with the West, they are losing out. If Africa plays its cards well, there are opportunities to be employed. He thinks Africa has never been in a better position. But it's up to the continent to make the most of the marriage with China.

In defense of China

A related issue of discussion is if China really respects its word of non-intervention in any country’s internal affairs. China is involved in peace keeping operations in six Sub-Saharan African countries. For the purposes of comparison, while China has around 1500 peace keepers in Africa and the US has only four, though the latter has the largest share in terms of money and materials donations.

Will Chinese non-intervention policy be kept in-tact as some of its investments are encountering major problems in Africa? It does not mean that China and Africa need not help each other in the international plane. The Chinese Ambassador to Ethiopia (in an interview conducted by VOA, Amharic Service) reiterates that China does not attach any conditions to its aid to African countries. Nor does it interfere in any other manner in the internal affairs of any country. Any aid and cooperation has no relation to politics. Although the direct monetary aid to Africa is low, the two parties trust each other. China does not care if an African country is democratic, respects human rights, etc or not. Both parties seem happy with it. Many African countries see China as an alternative source of funding and a good partner on providing cheap products.  

Unlike the Western countries, China does not impose its political system or values on other countries. Nor does it allow other countries to impose theirs on China. China focuses on general social welfare and economic development as opposed to individual rights. So, China does put the precondition of democratic election to offer aid and conduct investment in any country. First, China itself has no such system. Second; due to its foreign policy of non-intervention, Chinese government believes that it is up to a given government to follow its own choice of administrative system. Some African leaders are happy with Chinese policy of non-intervention as they are “sick” of the West’s naggings.

China's reluctance to delve into domestic affairs has raised concerns internationally, but many African leaders are excited about the desperately-needed roads, hospitals, schools, stadiums, dams and other major projects. But if China's business interests and citizens in Africa are increasingly caught in the crossfire of homegrown disputes, Beijing may be pushed into a more active role in the continent's political affairs, commented June Teufel Dreyer, a professor of Political Science at the University of Miami. She thinks they have never been uninvolved but this is a good reason to nudge them forward to more involvement.

The aforementioned and other more than few writers, politicians, media people, etc have treated the issues of China’s effort to politically influence African countries to adopt the ideological development advocated by China. Nevertheless, Ketema, based upon his research result claims that we have not seen any country which had fully adopted socialism as its mode of development exactly similar to China. Many Western scholars and the media treated the historical development with partial bias. Most of them approached China-Africa interactions in terms of Chinese interest and drive to impose her political will on African countries in the guise of supporting their independent movement.

However, researches show that relations between China and Africa in general were reflected in terms of complementary mutual support both politically and economically. Recently they were able to develop successful political and economic linkages and had been reinforcing China-Africa ties within the arena of contemporary international relations.

What African leaders think: Taking Meles as an example!

I think it is not difficult to imagine what African leaders think about China. Virtually all are happy with the presence of the Chinese in Africa in multifaceted sectors. Many of them believe that China is not repeating the history of the past colonizers. A good example is PM Melese Zenawi of Ethiopia. He does not think China is looting Africa but believes the Asian country cares about long-term economic cooperation.

Zenawi refuted Western media's allegation that China is dumping low-priced and poor-quality goods to Africa just noting that China is selling good-quality goods at relatively low prices and these goods suits the African market. According to Xinhua news agency, he said 90% of the goods in Addis Ababa’s biggest open market – MERCATO - were made in China. In fact, all markets of the all corners of the country sell Chinese products. These cheap products (not all necessarily of poor quality) improved living standards and provide alternatives of supply. There are people who say the flood of Chinese goods will undermine Africa’s national industry. But the premier does not think this is a problem reasoning that if one cannot compete with the global market, one has to get it from the global market. There is no alternative. That is globalization. He even makes the following interesting remarks: “the price is good. The bulk is good. So they compete with other foreign goods, and they compete with domestic goods as well. Who wins the competition? It is this product.”

However, as a matter of fact it is observed that cheap and mass-produced Chinese imports are flooding African markets and crippling some local industries, including textiles. Moreover, Africa cannot compete with the eye-catching Chinese fabrics and Chinese-made African prints that sell at a fraction of the price. Factories are closing down, and jobs are being lost.

I think many will agree with the following remarks uttered by the premier as he defends China against the Western allegation that the former is looting Africa. African countries were selling their natural resources to the global market before China came to their market. And they were not getting good prices for those goods. Rather, African countries are in a better position. China is buying these commodities with better prices. African countries want to sell their products at higher prices and buy at lower prices. China is providing this opportunity. If others provide a similar opportunity, Africans could seize this opportunity.

Compared to China’s involvement to the Western ones, unlike some Western countries, China's cooperation with African countries is based on boosting sustainable development in Africa. When Chinese firms are involved in tapping natural resources in Africa, they contribute to the continent's development at the same time by way of refunding the profits it has earned by reinvesting in infrastructural construction. Moreover, while mining oil and minerals in Africa, it pays much attention to the protection of local environment. So in summary, Africans are very comfortable to see China's increasing influence in Africa. So for Africa, the influence of China is not a source of concern or danger. It does not seem to have an element of imperialism. African countries are happy to see the rise of China.

In this line of argument on African resources, according to The Guardian, Liu Naiya of the Chinese Academy of Social Science believes that the West is hypocritical. Having long exploited Africa for resources and given little in return, except lectures. The big difference is that China does not attach political strings. On the contrary, when Western countries offer aid they usually insist on things like multi-party democracy, human right records, press freedom etc. But China’s aid is pure-hearted.

Still on this side of the war of opinions, an interview by ABBI Weekly - Ethiopia (2006/12/06) with Chinese Ambassador to Ethiopia, Mr. Lin Lin touches the issue as a passing remark. The question was: Some western countries have been loudly wondering about "China's hidden agenda in Africa". You have been accused of turning a blind eye to human rights abuses in some African countries and refusing to lay down governance conditionality on your African trading partners. For the Ambassador they are simply allegations and absolutely unfounded. He explained: in a long time of history, Africa had been subject to colonialism or invasion. Bound by historical constraints and others, African countries have difficulties, challenges and even problems. But it is groundless and ignorant, if not ridiculous, to blame them on China.

China has been pursuing an independent foreign policy of peace, and observing the purposes of the UN Charter and the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence in handling its relations with all the countries in the world, including African countries. Based on these guidelines, it has provided development assistance to Africa to the best of its capacity, which is genuine, selfless and transparent. It supports Africa for its democratization and judicial building, but as China never accepts any foreign country to impose its will on China, it is unlikely to see China impose its own will on African countries.

When it comes to human rights and good governance, it should be noted that China and Africa have long maintained exchanges on these issues. But the exchanges are held in a spirit of equality and mutual respects, with a view to drawing on each other's strength for common progress.

The Western media in general has not been fair with the Africa-China relations. They seem to lack the sight to see things on their positive side. Another Ethiopian authority – Foreign Minister Seyoum Mesfin – addresses this issue. Some negative reports by certain international media on Africa-China strategic relations of cooperation are not correct, and the international society should rightly treat the relations. The relationship between African countries and China would benefit international community and should not be retorted. He said many of the Western media reports on China-Africa Cooperation are "negative and tainted". It is "absolutely not true" to label African leaders as "dictators seeking new homeland in China" and "shunning their responsibilities on human rights". Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing has also addressed this allegation. He said he was certain the correspondents who wrote such reports did not catch the essence of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence or the UN Charter. Even he adds a bold remark that they found it difficult to understand the essence and importance of China-Africa cooperation

African countries and China are jointly pursuing the common value concept of mankind, including human rights. Although the partnership between Africa and China is not perfect, the two sides are capable of correctly dealing with all kinds of problems including the problem of governance.

The Sino-African partnership is brand new and of strategic importance and based on mutual respect and mutual responsibility.  The relationship is "predictable" and comes without any political strings. The new type of strategic partnership helps Africa score success in fighting poverty and overcoming difficulties in economic and social development. It also facilitates the development of China. Furthermore, the peaceful win-win development of China and African continent will surely benefit the world.

On top of what Seyoum has remarked, Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing assures that the friendly cooperation between China and Africa is aimed at promoting world peace and development and will not impair or threaten the interests of any other country. China-African cooperation is based on the respect for each other's territorial integrity and non-inference in others' internal affairs. For him peace and stability is the most important one exemplifying that China has participated in 12 of the UN's peacekeeping missions in Africa since 1996 and have sent more than 3,000 peacekeepers.

Conclusion

Imperialism is a policy of systematic domination and exploitation of a country or an empire. Imperialism means one nation imposing its will on others through the threat or actual use of force. If imperialism is understood this way, so far we can safely conclude that there is no evidence of China repeating the historical legacies of the Europeans, Americans and other colonizers-imperialists. It could be argued that imperialism can have many forms but this or that way, it is about imposing one’s interests against the will of the imposed. Can we say China is exercising hidden agendas that are beyond understanding of the African leaders, who are very much hand and glove with Beijing? As long as China truly adheres to the UN Charter and the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence; no conditions are attached or imposed to its aid, trade and investment towards the second largest Continent’s countries; no imposition of its political system or values on other countries; it requires twisting facts on the ground to name the PRC a modern imperialist.    

Araya Kebede Araya, LL B., MA, LL. M (PROLAW)

Lecturer in Law, Mekelle University, College of Law and Governance

Ethiopia, Mekelle - Adi Haqi Campus

Cell phone: +39 3896872473 (Rome, Italy), +251 923 771883 (Ethiopia)

E-mail: araya57k@gmail.com, aaraya@luc.edu

Blog: http://lawfordevelopment.blogspot.com/

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Critique against the EU’s Foreign Policy (A brief book review)

By Araya Kebede Araya*

Critique against the EU’s Foreign Policy (A brief book review)

·        The EU lacks a coherent foreign policy strategy

I, inspired by Prof. Wang Li’s lecture and class’ discussion, was immediately pushed to read a 2010 edition book entitled The Foreign Policy of the European Union: Assessing Europe’s Role in the World compiled and edited by Federiga Bindi as contributed by many authors on the theme. The book, inter alia, is about a critical assessment of EU (strategic) foreign policy.

Questioning if after all it is a ‘myth or a reality’, Federiga Bindi and Jeremy Shapiro slams EU’s foreign policy evolution as a mess, a simple fusion of different issue areas that were thrown together with little thought to overall strategy, and thus no parallels can be made with the foreign policies of its member states.

From a comparative perspective they argue that it is relatively easy to define, for example, the foreign policy of the USA, and one can even find a fairly accurate expression of it in official documents such as the “National Security Strategy of the United States.” The EU, in contrast, has not defined the goals of its foreign policy, to a large degree because it cannot agree on them. There is a “European Security Strategy” (ESS) document, published in 2003, that reads much like that of the USA, but it is in fact not a representation of what the EU actually wants to do in the world. In fact, it is quite clear when looking at the diversity of opinion on the EU’s role in the world among its member state populations and governments that the EU as a collective does not know what its foreign policy goals are. As the unsuccessful effort to update that strategy in 2008 showed, there is no longer even sufficient consensus to come up with a new document.

Towards establishing a common foreign policy

There is a long history of European efforts to establish a common foreign policy. The European nations first tried to pool resources in the field of defense, even before EEC. That proved a step too far: the European Defense Community (EDC) was initiated to respond to both domestic and international challenges: namely the problem of German rearmament and the Korean War. But when it became clear that that conflict was local, Europeans lost interest, forsaken the EDC, and in effect looked inward.

1960s

Even much of the progresses of the 1960s were reflections of domestic policies and problems. For example, the customs union brought with it a commercial policy, with a major boost coming from the GATT as it provided the EEC with a forum for negotiating as a unit. In the same years the EEC development policy responded to the need to deal with French colonies within a European framework to act together where France had failed separately with the Communauté Française. After the 1973 enlargement, development policy received a considerable improvement as it also came to include former British colonies.

1970s

During the 1970s the EC found itself not ready to deal with the changes the world was undergoing the notable events being the oil crisis and the Arab-Israeli wars. Relations with the United States also changed, and not for the better. Henry Kissinger, the then U.S. secretary of state, straightforwardly told the Europeans that they did not want to hear: that they have only regional interests. Offended, the Europeans tried to form a European political identity in order to express their global interests. In concrete terms that meant that for the first time they gave themselves a few specific instruments for dealing with foreign policy: the European Political Cooperation (EPC) and the European Council. By the end of the 1970s, international events conspired to remind Europe that it could not ignore the wider world and could not simply rely on the United States to define its interests in the world. The refusal of the Europeans to go along with American sanctions against Iran after the revolution in 1979 or to join the U.S. boycott of the Moscow Olympics in 1980 in response to the Russian invasion of Afghanistan are two prominent examples that showed that the Europeans do exist and that they do not always agree with the United States.

1980s

During the 1980s, with the accession of Greece, Spain, and Portugal, the EC essentially comprised all of Western Europe. There was a general sense that as a geographic entity the EC needed a qualitative leap forward in its capacity to act geopolitically. The Single European Act of 1986 gave the EPC a permanent secretariat and entrusted the EC Presidency with representing Europe internationally. In the same years, with the accession of Spain and Portugal, the EEC became interested in Latin America, conducting the San Jose dialogue to create links with the Latin American countries and to send a signal to the United States that Latin America would no longer be its exclusive sphere of influence. The EEC also pushed the new democracies in Latin America to create regional groupings in the image of the EC.

Redefining Europe

1990s

During the 1990s, the fall of the Berlin Wall redefined the very meaning of Europe, while the conflicts in the Balkans confirmed the dangers of a weak Europe. Internally, collapse of the USSR meant a reunited Germany, which posed a challenge to existing structure of Europe. In 1992 the Treaty on the EU sought to secure a bigger Germany in a stronger Europe, with a common European currency and a stronger foreign and defense policy. Ultimately, the result in the field of foreign policy was the CFSP, which was actually an institutional upgrade of the EPC rather than a coherent foreign policy. The European failure to act resolutely in the Balkans meant that the 1990s was also the time in which the Europeans started discussing defense seriously. The results were relatively weak institutions (the ESDP) rather than a strong common defense policy. Only after the civil wars ended in the Balkans was the EU able to make a difference on the ground.

All in all, however, the main priority of the 1990s was the relationship with the central European countries. With an eye toward granting these countries membership, the EU negotiated enhanced Association Agreements with them. The fall of the Berlin Wall also naturally led to an attempt—not always successful—to enhance relations with Russia and with the other states of the former Soviet Union, which would soon become the EU’s neighbors. Last but not least, the early 1990s saw an attempt to become a major actor in the Mediterranean with the Barcelona dialogue and to go global by relaunching relations with Asia and the United States.

The previous decade – 2000s

After ‘September 11’, European internal security also became an issue, in response to the presence of terrorism as well as the massive entry of immigrants to Europe. The big bang enlargement to the east in 2004 made Europe and the EU nearly synonymous, at least as geographic expressions. The EU’s continental scope aspired a global role, but the burdens of integrating the new members, the even more awkward decision making processes, and the divisions introduced by a new members meant that the expanded Europe was even less capable of making a viable foreign policy.

Conclusion:  towards formulating a security strategy

In general, the EU’s foreign policymakers have as a rule reacted to specific events and situations as opposed to forming a forward looking strategy. In other words, the EU and its member states have responded tactically to events, adding competencies in foreign policy at the EU level when there was an urgent need or a specific opportunity rather than according to some finely elaborated strategy.

In effect, this approach has been disappointing to its members, its publics, and the EU institutions themselves, in particular. However, the EU has also developed an ideological basis for foreign policy as well as institutions and capacities that have the power to serve as the foundation for more significant achievements. An EU foreign policy would require a more strategic stance to realize that potential. The setting up of ESS was an important step in that regard, but creating a strategy document is not the same as having a strategy. The formulation of a security strategy should be a political process, an effort to build consensus around a broad approach to securing a polity’s interests. It is much more than just a document; it is a process that seeks to negotiate the limits of what the polity can agree on, to smooth out the most logically incompatible edges of that consensus, and to produce a document that can command widespread respect and agreement. The resulting strategy document, even if it gets the headlines, is the least important part of that process—it is the result of a political negotiation, not the impetus for a strategic change. The ESS was not created through such a political process; rather the ESS process was heavily centralized in the staff of the EU’s High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana. The editors even make strong concluding remark that reads the European Union lacks the institutional infrastructure to carry out such a process.

Araya Kebede Araya, LL B., MA, LL. M (PROLAW)

Lecturer in Law, Mekelle University, College of Law and Governance

Ethiopia, Mekelle - Adi Haqi Campus

Cell phone: +39 3896872473 (Rome, Italy), +251 923 771883 (Ethiopia)

E-mail: araya57k@gmail.com, aaraya@luc.edu

Blog: http://lawfordevelopment.blogspot.com/

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Judging China’s growth by its norm: an emerging threat or a rising peace?

By Araya Kebede Araya*

Judging China’s growth by its norm: an emerging threat or a rising peace?[1]

China’s growth since its open door policy has provided a controversial issue: an emerging threat or a rising peace. The former is based on conventional wisdom which has witnessed unavoidable wars among great powers, whereas the latter offers a fresh alternative on the basis of regional norms and culture. From the viewpoint of normative approach, the two different frameworks actually replicate and predict international relations in terms of the significant role of norms in the field of international politics. How about in the robust Chinese progress case?

This essay takes a perspective and explains what makes norms revive across different time periods, different regions and political systems. Do we have a revived norm in contemporary China? If any, what made its revival and what does this revived norm say about the current activities and behaviours of the P. R. China?

The simple and direct answer for the issue what makes norms/ideas revive across different time periods and political systems is – norms happen to better explain the contemporary international system; and countries and regions found them working well compared to or as a complementary to the other traditional (like Realist) explanations. Actors are always in search of justifications for their deeds. On this score, as the United States chew the norms of Human Rights and Democracy; China on the other end, time and again, mentions Confucianism and its related conceptual ideas to justify its relations with the external world.

Despite the fact that historical trend and conventional wisdom are in favour of arguing China’s growth as a threat; we will see below that it is not an emerging threat but rather a rising peace.

International relations analysts who support the former view argue that big powers in history are all able to export their culture-philosophical ideas. The Roman Empire was powerful because of attraction to its religious philosophy; France had its heyday because of its “Human Rights Declaration” that preached freedom, equality and love; Grate Britain became an empire in which the sun never set because of the spread of the European civilization packaged in the English language in the world; the supremacy of the United States is to be achieved by the democratic system and the values of liberty and democracy. For all these big powers in history and now, argues Liu Binjie (P. 48), their philosophical thinking is more powerful than their almighty military organizations, and it was and is such philosophical thinking that has put them in a leading position in international affairs. China, concludes the aforementioned author, does not possess such philosophical thinking, so the cries about “China threat” are far-fetched and fictional. The Chinese culture of ‘harmony and conformity’ is at the core of Chinese traditional philosophy, from which later culture emerged.

Ideological concepts and diplomatic language aim for the same thing and they are deeply rooted in the Chinese mentality. When Chinese philosophy came into being, it focused on coming into the world, heaven and earth, human and harmony. There are natural differences between the continental culture of the East and Oceanic cultures of the West. While China aims primarily for a peaceful life and harmonious relationships, the West attempts to conquer the world and seek for overseas expansion.  China has never had the culture of seeking hegemonism, to say nothing of causing hardship and sufferings to other countries and people. This has been so for thousands of years.

As far back as 3000 years ago, the Book of Changes, one most important classical of the Chinese nation, appeared and embodied in it the thinking that all things under heaven were in great harmony and the changes between Yin and Yang all had their own way. The word ‘harmony’ derives home the point - it means achieving smoothens despite difference and disparity.          

Back to the question, some norms did not have the chance to be tested if they can serve best in explaining countries’ international relations. Other norms revive as a result of trial and error meaning that they happened to be better when compared to other norms or/and tools to explain the international arena better. In these instances; as it could be that norms guide the world only as a subsidiary part of material and power, Constructivists strongly argue that norms per se can explain contemporary international relations equally if not better.

We will continue to have a look on a book by Liu Binjie entitled China’s Philosophy on Foreign Affairs in the 21^st Century: China in Peaceful Development (2006) on this very score. First my general understanding!   

If we take the case of East Asia, we see the strong Confucian norm strongly reviving over other values dictated mainly by its alleged motherland - China. Generally put, Confucianism as a core value of Chinese Foreign Policy used to be employed by Chinese authorities up until the Qing Dynasty. However; with the formation of PRC, Confucianism along with other ‘olds’ - old custom, old culture, old ideas and old habits – was endangered let alone to serve as a basis of China’s Foreign Policy relations. Since the Cultural Revolution up to the onset of the opening up policy, Confucianism and related norms were highly denounced.   It is only with the radical shift of policy that the thinking of Confucianism, of revised version, I guess, demonstrates revival. 

In this connection, Liu Binjie tried to locate the ideological source of China’s Philosophy on Foreign Affairs. As a central theme, he pointed out that China would be in Peaceful Development. He quoted Margaret H. Thatcher (P.48), former Prime Minister of the UK. She wrote that China would not become a superpower threatening others because it does not have power to expand and to weaken the strength of Western countries, and what China can export is TV instead of ideology!

 Some quote history to Justify Chinese peace-liking behaviour. Confucius was an educator, thinker as well as a great philosopher. His thoughts are the basis of Chinese cultural tradition and still have an influence today. In Confucian philosophy, four words have special resonant. The first is ‘Yi’ - righteousness. It means that every person should follow certain moral norms in doing things, i.e., he should bear in mind his social responsibility and obligation. The second is ‘ren’ – benevolence or humanity. It means that man should have a heart full of love for others. The third is ‘Shu’ – forbearance. It stresses that one should treat others in the same way that you hope to be treated. The fourth is ‘he’ – harmony. In handling international relations as well as wars and disputes, it is essential to keep in mind the principle that ‘harmony is what matters’ harmony makes a nation prosper and unity benefits both sides. These Confucian thoughts have become the moral precepts of the Chinese nation as well as codes of conduct for later generation.    

In sum, we can say that there are several motives for norms to revive like interest. But the argument norms revive for the sake of fulfillment of interests is the very realist thinking. However, as it can be seen in the pervasive Confucianism, countries can use their norms to justify their deeds in the international arena like regions or truly international one.    

Araya Kebede Araya, LL B., MA, LL. M (PROLAW)

Lecturer in Law, Mekelle University, College of Law and Governance

Ethiopia, Mekelle - Adi Haqi Campus

Cell phone: +39 3896872473 (Rome, Italy), +251 923 771883 (Ethiopia)

E-mail: araya57k@gmail.com, aaraya@luc.edu

Blog: http://lawfordevelopment.blogspot.com/

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[1] The question for this essay is framed by my instructor and thesis Advisor Dr. Myungsik Ham, Jilin University – Institute of International Studies.