Araya Kebede Araya* August 9, 2010
Ethio-China relations: exemplary ‘asymmetric win-win’
Even though, prima facie, the Ethio-China relation seems to demonstrate interdependence, win-win style; we can better explain it via asymmetry but demonstrating an interdependence win-win scenario so long as the scale is not balanced. Why asymmetry?
This essay argues asymmetry theory can better explain the existing Ethio-China relations. Brantley Womack in his May 2010 published book of collection of his previous articles wrote ‘[a]symmetry theory …has broader applications… Since the theory is grounded not in a specific culture but in the differences of relational exposure inherent in asymmetry, it should apply to any asymmetric relationship, at any time. Even more generally, the view of the world system from the perspective of asymmetry theory is that of an active but ultimately fairly stable matrix of unequal relationships.’ (Brantly Womack, China Among Unequals, May 2010, Introduction) I would say that the explanations can also be expanded to economic relations as well. How? I will address it around the end of the essay.
The Ethio-China relation is predominantly of economic nature. Aside this, the strength of their connection in other areas is not as such in its high level. The politics aspect is also much weaker: things are not subject to politics similar to, I guess, any other part of the world where China is increasing its role in the economic affairs of individual countries.
Although its ultimate true intention is yet to be dug out, China’s involvement in Ethiopia is from time to time growing both in depth and coverage of sectors. Prima facie, the contemporary relationship does not lead one to have negative assessment of each other’s foreign policy as far as both countries are enjoying happy ends with the existing atmosphere.
I will not be assessing their economic relations scale in this only brief essay. But, we can sum that China is by far enjoying the upper hand. What is important is one should ask what the primary motives behind the massive Chinese involvement in many countries of the world, in general, and Ethiopia, in particular, are. How can we explain this scenario? Who is getting the lion’s share? Who wants the relations to be sustained? Who is going to lose more if anything wrong happens in between? What theoretical framework can fit it? Can the explanation also be comfortably used in other countries’ relations vis-à-vis China? In effect, can the generalization be effectively and comprehensively used to explain Chinese Foreign Policy towards, esp., developing countries, in the real practice?
The overarching driver has been the Chinese government’s strategic pursuit of resources and attempts to ensure raw material supplies for growing energy needs within China, in part reflecting the country’s position as a centre of global manufacturing. (C. Alden, D. Large and R. S. Oliveira, 2008: 2) Most significant Chinese activity and investment [in Africa in general and Ethiopia, in particular,] is related to this demand, rooted in domestic economic and political changes in China and the changing profile of resource needs accompanying its economic development and role in the global economy. ‘An unprecedented need for resources is now driving China’s foreign policy.’ (Zweig and Jianhui, 2005: 25; Taylor, 2006b) Note that Ethiopia is endowed with reasonably rich unexploited natural resources and a big area of arable land that can be used to export agricultural products.
A further factor is [Ethiopia’s] status as an arena for Chinese companies to develop and a market with strong commercial potential for Chinese business. (C. Alden, D. Large and R. S. Oliveira, 2008:4) The Chinese government, businesses, and entrepreneurs have regarded (or, for many businesses, been financially encouraged to regard) Africa as a continent of economic potential populated by consumers. Explicitly rejecting ‘[Ethio]-pessimism’, to date they appear to have not been overly encumbered by investment constraints or concern about instability that have wrongly affected other investors. Central government support for Chinese state owned enterprises (SOEs) has been important in directing FDI in Africa, as opposed to other regions, though proportionally speaking, Africa has received a comparatively minor share of China’s total overseas FDI; in 2006, Africa took 4% of China’s total FDI (as compared to Europe’s 3%, Latin America’s 26% and Asia’s 64%). You can imagine Ethiopia’s share!
Nevertheless, Chinese do have more than 1000 companies which are producing different commodities for the purpose of utterly controlling export market in Ethiopia, the Horn as well as Africa. The most important point is also that Ethiopia is the second most populous country in the Continent.
Finally, there are political factors operating as part of what is styled ‘win-win cooperation’ (C. Alden, D. Large and R. S. Oliveira, 2008:4). Since helping China gain admission to the UN, African states including Ethiopia have supported China (including in the years following 1989) in different multilateral settings. China in turn styles itself as leader of the global South and champion of a progressive ‘new international political and economic order featuring justice, rationality, equality and mutual benefit’ and ‘safeguarding legitimate rights and interests of developing countries.’ (China’s African Policy, January 2006, Part IV (5).)
Even though, prima facie, the Ethio-China relation seems to demonstrate interdependence, win-win style; we can better explain it via asymmetry but demonstrating an interdependence win-win scenario so long as the scale is not balanced. Why asymmetry?
Despite the fact that there seems little or no possibility of using military or political muscle to defend and enforce its benefits; China’s economic leverage is as mighty as other instruments. It is true that China needs Ethiopia for resources and market including the vast construction sector (both actually and more potentially). However, if we compare who needs more? Which of them can have more alternatives in terms of the aforementioned two contemporary main drivers? No question it is China that is on the throne again. Therefore, the writer concludes that Ethiopia needs China more as the former has lesser options in terms of pursuing its aspirations of fast growing economy. The current (im)balance of trade between the two countries strengthens this position. The trade deficit exists on the side of Ethiopia not because China does not offer market opportunities but rather due to Ethiopia’s limited production and export capacity. Note that China has offered on an additional 4,000 tariff lines, an expansion over the 400 tariff lines that the country currently enjoys. (Minister Sofian Ahmed, http://www.afriquejet.com/news/africa-news/china-to-double-trade,-investment-levels-with-ethiopia-2010011241861.html). However, Ethiopia has employed only small part of the opportunity.
After all, China is also a donor although the Chinese do not want it to be explicitly said so at least up until recently. The salient characteristic of Chinese aid is clearly that it is not as explicitly intrusive or prescriptive as Western practice. This is particularly the case when it comes to the absence of explicit and public political conditionality - ‘no [political] strings attached’ - with the important and sole exception of the One China principle but the prevailing, indeed normative, absence of prescriptive engagement on governance clearly contrasts with prevailing Western approaches. When it comes to economic policy and relations, however, the indications are, as might be expected, that strings are attached as a normal part of trade or bilateral business engagement. An important distinguishing feature of Chinese aid and development assistance is offered on the basis of stated ‘equality and mutual benefit’ in a spirit of partnership geared toward common benefit. This contrast with standard Western donor practice marks a basic and fundamental difference in approach that remains politically consequential.(C. Alden, D. Large and R. S. Oliveira, 2008:6) Notwithstanding the nature of the aid they offer, it still puts the Chinese on the dominant position that gives them confidence over Ethiopia. Hence asymmetry (despite being distant in geography terms)! However, ‘[i]t should be emphasized that a normal asymmetric relationship ….. is not a relationship of domination.’ (Brantly Womack, China Among Unequals, May 2010, Introduction).
Araya Kebede Araya, LL B., MA, LL. M (PROLAW)
Lecturer in Law, Mekelle University, College of Law and Governance
Ethiopia, Mekelle - Adi Haqi Campus
Cell phone: +39 3896872473 (Rome, Italy), +251 923 771883 (Ethiopia)
E-mail: araya57k@gmail.com, aaraya@luc.edu
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