By Araya Kebede Araya*
The Role of History in IR Theoretical framework: to create an institution[1]
Does history matter in international relations? If history matters, why and how does it matter? This essay explains logically the way historical narratives can be main resources of international relations theoretical framework. For example, how norms, ideas or identities create institutions as an outcome of rational design and make them work even without specific organizations, committees or representative systems.
The main point is all about assimilation of or narrowing the gap between rational/positive knowledge (as relevance of history is asked) and normative knowledge (as roles of norms, ideas and identities is asked) so as to have a rational but at the same time appropriate result. As a result of the process and an ultimate outcome of rational design, how norms, ideas and identities are employed so as to have a self-sufficient institution that does not essentially require specific organizations, committees or representative systems.
Does history matter? How far can it travel?
Having the merit of ‘LOGIC OF CONSEQUENCES thinking’ in mind, I would answer the question, if history matters in international relations, to the affirmative. However, reliance only on history takes us no where. It can only provide us with part of the required KNOWLEDGE to better explain the international system. As Alexander Wendt rightly put it in his article entitled ‘Driving with Rearview Mirror: On the Rational Science of Institutional Design’ (P.1020), while he doubts if rationality can tell us everything, he certainly thinks it can tell us a lot.
The process of rational design results in institutions - designs. The theory of rational design is that states and other actors choose international institutions to further their own interests. (Snidal, Koremenos, Lipson - quoted in Wendt P. 1020) What kinds of interests? What if the rationally chosen interests are immoral, self-destructive, etc? If the driving forces within this institution designing process are ideas, norms and identities, would the common interests the actors pursuing be different? Do we have “RULES OF RECOGNITION” for the interests?
Yes, the standards are the would-be normatively carved principles. The (rational) choice will be appropriate as it is a result of practical knowledge and not only that of explanatory knowledge. The rational design should not be attractive to some and not to others. It has to be equally favoring to members and, even, to non-members. Wendt on this score: ‘If for a single actor rational action is what subjectively maximizes its interests, then when there are multiple actors, as in international politics, a rationally chosen institution will be one that solves their collective-action (but still one-sided) problem, not one that necessarily solves a problem in the external world.’ (P.1023, Emphasis supplied) Once it is able to solve any problem, including the external world’s ones, the implication is that the collective-action problems are no more subjectively understood rather determined by OBJECTIVE facts in the world. The solution will also be in line with the reality.
Hence, the economics theory of rational expectations: that the expected consequences of design choices will generally correspond to the actual ones. Mitchell and Keilbatch coin a term for this i.e., compliance to ‘the structure of the situation’. Moreover, the problems are constructed by a communicative process of interpreting what that world means and how and why designers should care about it. (Kratochwil, 1989). This analysis takes us to the part of the essay’s issue – institutions working without organs. (The discussion is taken up in the last section of this essay – argument based on Constitutional Structure.)
Historical examples on norms changing actors’ behaviors
There are several historical incidents whereby the LOGIC OF APPROPRIATENESS (judgment of right or wrong) supersedes that of logic of consequences or cost-benefit calculation. Some example are the ‘nuclear taboo’ where nuclear was not used in Vietnam War despite compelling situations and U.S.’ refraining from conquering the Bahamas, that landlocked states have a say on the Law of the Sea, Luxembourg votes in the EU, inclusion of Russia in G-8, no exemption for murder in the human rights regime, etc (Tennenwald 1999, Wendt, 1999, Mitchell and Kilbach, 2001). According to the authors, all happenstances occurred due to normative grounds. How? As actors become socialized to norms, they make them part of their identity, and that identity in turn creates a collective interest in norms as ends in themselves. Do such norms fulfill actors’ interest? Not necessarily so. Such actors follow the norms not because it is in their self-interest, but it is intrinsically the RIGHT or GOOD thing to do in their society. (More on level of identities required, please see below)
It is important to observe the pervasive nature of norms. There is widely accepted argument in international law whether international law is really a law since we observe many violations and there is no international compulsory legislature, police and court. The argument proponents advise us not to focus on the few violations or non-performance of treaties. The untold, unheard observances of treaties (which are not news so we cannot hear them usually) comprise the largest share of the discipline. This branch of law is widely respected due to the logic of consequences and largely due to the logic of appropriateness. To borrow Wendt’s statement, ‘society would not be as stable as it is if people always applied [only] logic of consequences to their actions, and so international norms may explain much of the rule-following we see in international life. (Id.
Why history matters
History (historical or explanatory knowledge) matters as it can explain the past which in turn, if effectively employed, can be used to predict the future. The problem is that it does not provide with complete account of the required knowledge to set an all encompassing theoretical framework of IR theory. The knowledge required is one that can pass the tests of time and space. Therefore, we can appreciate history’s contribution while taking note of its insufficiency. So what is the remedy?
The remedy
The remedy is we need also practical knowledge to buttress the explanatory one. Institutional designers need making or practical knowledge – a knowledge about what to do on top of the incomplete explanatory knowledge. As Henry Jackman concisely put it, ‘we live forwards but understand backwards’. (In Wendt, ibid) But the ‘forwards’ cannot be reduced to that of ‘backwards’. Knowing about the history or why we acted in the past can teach us valuable lessons but past is only conditionally related to the future unless we believe in determinism.
For Example, whether actors preserve an existing institution like state sovereignty or design a new one like the EU is up to them. Here relies the very point where the past cannot provide us with. Put it in other ways, the voluntarism inherent in this question is something that positive social science (for our purpose here, history) is not well-equipped to handle but norms can. Even such norms need to create a reasonably good level of common identities and interests amongst the possible actors too bring them together to think about institutions that can solve common and collective problems.
Level of collective identity required
In the process of creating an institution, in addition to historical knowledge and ideas and norms; there is one more element that has to be fulfilled: collective identity. How states come to see ‘institutions as a solution’ to collective-action problems? We might point to the norms of international society as a prerequisite such that it is only with the attainment of a certain level of collective identity that the rational design of institutions becomes possible. (Hadley Bull on Wendt’s, 1999; emphasis supplied)
Enabling institutions to run on their own
The theoretical explanation is that norms, ideas and identities once well established they do not need any other pillar to help them function. They do not need committee, organization or special representative. They are self-sufficient. The way they are created makes them so. The end result is, therefore, strong enough to hold every actor and action in place. There is no way back as all involved are already in an appropriate outcome.
Here, I think, C. Reus-Smit’s Constitutional Structures comes to the fore. Once actors build Constitutional Structures of meta-values defining legitimate statehood and rightful state action, institutions can run on their own as the Structure incorporates hegemonic beliefs about the moral purpose of the state, the organizing principle of sovereignty, and norms of pure procedural justice. (pp. 559, 567) This strong hold of Constitutional Structure characterizes fundamental institutions which in turn define issue specific regimes or institutions.
Conclusion
Although sociological (identities) and constructivist (norms and ideas) approaches seem in contradiction to rational design theory in the process of institution creation, they in fact are complementary in the sense that they ‘could refer to explanations that do not contradict rational-design theory but imbed it within broader social or historical contexts that construct its elements (preferences, beliefs and so on).
It is about bringing about consequentialism and normative knowledge together. It is about how the logic of appropriateness may help structure international institutions designed by rational actors so that the end result will be right. If norms and ideas are to bring about similar identities and interests, even actors will go for their best interests; they will ultimately be questing similar interests. Hence, logic of consequences and logic of appropriateness complement one another. This is the possible place where rational choice and norm meet in the process of designing an institution.
Araya Kebede Araya, LL B., MA, LL. M (PROLAW)
Lecturer in Law, Mekelle University, College of Law and Governance
Ethiopia, Mekelle - Adi Haqi Campus
Cell phone: +39 3896872473 (Rome, Italy), +251 923 771883 (Ethiopia)
E-mail: araya57k@gmail.com, aaraya@luc.edu
======
[1] The question for this essay is framed by my instructor and adviser Dr Ham, Jilin University – Institute of International Studies
No comments:
Post a Comment