Do institutions really matter?

By Araya Kebede Araya

Do institutions really matter?

This essay attempts to address the undue focus on the lessened role of institutions on security issues while ignoring their (institutions) achievements in many other issue-areas so as to let them be conceived as weak instruments of international relations.

Thomson and Snidal (1999), in their article International Organization have cited a lot of authorities witnessing that the application of institution has been expanded to a wide variety of issue-areas, including international security, trade, finance, telecommunications, and the environment. International legal scholars have also increasingly used institutions to better understand issues such as international trade laws, arms control agreements, and the law of treaties.    

Problem of defining ‘institution’                 

One of the problems in this area is that scholars do not agree on the definition of the term institution. A widely adhered ‘standard’ definition by S. Krasner (1983) presents regimes/institutions as sets of implicit principles, norms, rules and decision making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations. However, scholars like Mearsheimer, in his article entitled false promise of international institutions do not agree on this definition. Even he mocks that Krasner’s definition lacks analytical bite. Strange (1982) has also criticized it as vague. They have, instead, provided their own definitions. Nevertheless, the way Krasner defines institutions enables us to assess the role of institutions in almost all walks of life. The definition makes up Regime Theory that premises: international politics is highly interdependent (Keohane and Nye, 1977) implying mutual interests in cooperation and (b) international behavior is institutionalized in a variety of ways (Ruggie, 1975).

Main scholars and theories said on the score

Mearsheimer (p.8) derisively wrote that institutionalists consider institutions to be a powerful force for stability. R. Keohane, for example, declares that, avoiding military conflict in Europe after the Cold War depends greatly on whether period is characterized by a continuous pattern of institutionalized cooperation. Commenting on the aftermath of the Soviet collapse and the end of the Cold War, John Ruggie maintains that there seems little doubt that multilateral norms and institutions have helped stabilize their international consequences. Indeed, such norms and institutions appear to be playing a significant role in the management of a broad array of regional and global changes in the world system today.

Realists maintain that institutions are basically a reflection of the distribution of power in the world. They are based on the self-interested calculations of the great powers, and they have no independent effect on state behavior. Realists therefore believe that institutions are not an important cause of peace. They matter only on the margins. Mearsheimer (P.8) himself concludes that institutions have minimal influence on state behavior, and thus hold little promise for promoting stability.  

Institutionalists directly challenge this view arguing instead that institutions can alter state preferences and therefore change state behavior. Institutions can discourage states from calculating self-interest on the basis of how every move affects their relative power positions. Institutions are independent variables, and they have the capability to move states away from war. (ibid) Liberal institutionalism maintains increased cooperation in economic and environmental cooperation is presumed to reduce the likelihood of war. (In Mearsheimer, p.9)

David Mitrany’s functionalist theory states that technological advancements and the desire to promote welfare concerns were seen as creating a need for intestate cooperation that required both international governmental organizations and non-governmental organizations to manage the necessary technical support. Neofunctionalism extended this argument by suggesting that successful collaboration in one area would increase the benefits of cooperation in related areas, and generate joint pressure from domestic interest groups and international officials to extend the realm of cooperation. (Haas, 1964; Linberg and Scheingold 1971; Groom and Taylor, 1975)

Interdependence theory: Long term and increasing interactions among states in all fields of activity – including health, technology, security, environment, culture and economics – mean that even the most powerful states are sensitive to occurrences elsewhere and cannot always achieve their goals by themselves. Small states that are dependent on larger states have even stronger reasons to seek support from such organizations. Moreover, this interdependence takes increasingly complex forms, including the increase in the number of significant transactional actors such as multinational corporations and environmental groups. (Keohane and Nye, 1972, 1977)

Institutions are of various forms. There are more of institutions if we see them as ordering principles. The emphasis on formal international organization represents a narrow view of the forms, and possibilities for, international governance. Focusing on the formal ‘classic’ model of institutions blinds us not to see their improved roles somewhere else. It is good to note that formal organizations are only one amongst numerous institutional possibilities. (Thomson and Snidal, pp. 701-2) The following conceptions provide a broad ordering principle of international system: the realist conception of self-help in anarchy, English school view of ‘society’, Marxist theories of imperialism (Lenin, 1917), and ‘world capitalist system’ (Wallerstein, 1979).

Hugo Grotius’ international society focuses on the system of states as an international society that contains persistent elements of order (Bull, 1977; Wight, 1977) According to Bull, states form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions. This framework of rules and institutions guides state behavior in patterned ways. Finnimore (1996a) emphasizes on this score: states embedded in a dense network of social relations that shape their judgments, define their interests according to ‘internationally shared norms and values that structure and give meaning to international political life’. The English school theorists (see Hurrell, 1993) connote that states abide by rules and norms, even when it is not in their material interest, for they have a long-term interest in the maintenance of a ‘law-impregnated international community and share a sense of moral community.         

Robert Keohane’s After Hegemony (1984) is another important vanguard that provides very strong argument for institutions. For him, regimes can respond to political market failures. Like imperfect markets, world politics is characterized by institutional deficiencies that inhibit mutually advantageous cooperation. While bargaining could correct these problems (Coase, 1960) he argues that the underlying conditions like well-defined property rights, perfect information and zero transactions costs do not naturally exist in the international system. It is institutions that can solve the problem so as to facilitate cooperation among states on a decentralized basis. By clustering issues together in the same forums over a long period of time, regimes help to bring governments into continuing interaction with one another, reducing incentives to cheat and enhance the value of reputation. By establishing legitimate standards of behavior for states to follow and by providing ways to monitor compliance, they create the basis for decentralized enforcement founded on the principle of reciprocity.

Personal reflection

I believe institutions do matter. There are massive international trade, investment (economic), political, and social relations that run amongst members of the international system due to institutions. They are not mere expressions of power. They are not always there for the hegemon. If we open our eyes wide, we see institutions working on their own. On the contrary, if we are enslaved by the only more than few exceptions to the rule of smooth working of institutions, it is natural to conclude institutions are totally dependent on other variables like power – that puff towards the power breaths.   

Krasner’s definition allows us to take treaties as institutions. Many focus on a small fraction of treaties that happened, unfortunately, to be violated to use as evidence that institutions/treaties do only matter a little. But, how many treaties (including bilateral ones) are really violated? Does it mean the agreements did not work? A law is broken by individuals does not necessarily mean there is no order in the country.  I think it should be taken as normal violation of law.

To use analogy from law: If you ask ordinary people what law means, they will at first thought tell you about criminal law and not civil and commercial law. Why? It is merely because that part of law they usually hear violated. It is all on the news! On the contrary civil law violations do not make hot news. However, to our surprise only 5% to 10% of the law of a given country comprises criminal law. Ordinary people do not mention civil law which is by far the greatest part of the law that affects their daily life. The same holds good for institutions: it is only when institutions are violated that we say - here we go, look! Institutions do not work. Would it be made an issue if the agreement/institution is observed, if a contract/institution is respected? Not really.

 

In sum, I am not saying that institutions are working in absolute terms. Rather, what I argue is that the actual contribution of institutions is not appreciated as it should have been. Exceptions have reigned over the rules – few violations of institutions have dominated the relatively smoothly working institutions. 

It is true that international institutions are not strong in bringing world peace and stability as they do in other issue-areas does not necessarily imply they are totally weak in all walks of life.  Institutions do greatly promote trade, investment, culture in addition to greatly contributing in the world peace and stability.

Contemporary examples

The recent Copenhagen and Cancun forums for climate discussion are good examples of the growing role of institutions on common affairs. The result may not be perfectly fitting to what the world in general and developing countries in particular needed. It is better to opine like half-full glass not the other way round - we have to emphasize on what has been achieved not only on what is not and then seek more. It is a progress.   

Another example is the strong institution created by African states and China. Currently, China seems the most advantaged from the relations but majority of African countries (which I am sure of Ethiopia!) are gaining much, may be, for the first time in history. Not many countries have ever been happy in history in their relations with other countries as with China. Is it because of force?

Araya Kebede Araya, LL B., MA, LL. M (PROLAW) 

Lecturer in Law, Mekelle University, College of Law and Governance 

Ethiopia, Mekelle - Adi Haqi Campus 

Cell phone: +39 3896872473 (Rome, Italy), +251 923 771883 (Ethiopia)

E-mail: araya57k@gmail.com, aaraya@luc.edu

Blog: http://lawfordevelopment.blogspot.com/

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Corruption for growth and development!

By Araya Kebede Araya

Corruption for growth and development!

Yes it is conventional wisdom of corruption that the latter may be reduced with the expansion of rule based and more market oriented institutions. It is also widely accepted that the role of corruption, in part, has been contributive to economic growth in East Asia. Are these compatible? By way of explaining the role of corruption for distinctive economic accomplishment for a short period in East Asia; I will develop the essay showing that it is due to other factors/reasons and not because the East Asian states lacked the aforementioned institutions and rules to tackle corruption that it was widespread but, fortunately and unexpectedly (unintentionally – D. Kang, said it!), was to their economic growth.

Caution! By definition, corruption is inherently evil!

As we will discuss below, the fact that corruption in the history of some selected East Asian countries, at macro level, has facilitated their growth does not imply: a) it harms no one in the country b) some individuals have not gained undue advantage c) it can be officially adopted by a country as a viable economic growth model d) at micro level honest and law abiding businesspersons are not disadvantaged as their competitors enjoyed special treatment by the corrupt government officials. 

There are several explanations why corruption has not affected their growth rather facilitated their economic performance.

According to Wedeman (P.3), although it is widely assumed that corruption has negative consequences, the fact remains that the Chinese economy, despite the existence of corruption, has performed remarkably well. Between 1979 and 2002 the Chinese economy outperformed the rest of the world by a factor of ten, with GDP growing 500.8 per cent in real per capita terms versus a global average of 44.6 per cent. According to Shliefer and Vishny, the negative consequences of hierarchically organized high-level corruption ought to be less than anarchic low-level corruption because high-level corruption is generally more predictable and hence reduces risk and transaction costs. If so, then the apparent contradiction between "worsening" corruption and China's extraordinarily high rate of growth might be, in part, a function of reductions in low-level corruption and the forging of a collusive relationship between high-ranking cadres and the emerging business community, wherein those with political power have material incentives to facilitate profit-making by their "business partners." (Wedeman, P.28)

Mushtaq Khan (pp.1, 13) provides another explanation why, where corruption may not be harmful but rather can facilitate growth of a given country. It is related not to the extent of corruption but rather to the political structures which sustain different processes through which rights are created and reallocated. The distribution of power within the patron-client networks in which corruption is taking place is an important variable explaining the differences in the efficiency effects of corruption. Where patrons are powerful the range of rights transacted is limited and the allocation is likely to be efficiency maximizing (South Korea, Taiwan) In contrast where patrons are weak the range of rights transacted is likely to be much wider with the rights allocated according to political calculations with large efficiency costs (Philippines under Marcos, Bangladesh under Ershad).

Similarly, David Kang (pp. 25-26) in his article “Bad Loans to Goods Friends” explains how the Korean state acted in a number of developmental ways to provide public goods and nurture investment against the existence of rampant corruption. The mutual-hostage situation of political elite and business persons in Korea was a key factor in keeping corruption from spinning out of control and rather be invested. In other terms, having smaller numbers of rent seekers reduces the total social cost because property rights over the rent are more secure. Moreover, the money just was changing hands but within the country. Bribes are transfers! 

David Kang, based on the above analysis, somewhere else shows the destructive effects of corruption in countries like the Philippines and Indonesia as the factors existing in South Korea were lacking. 

J. S. Nye (pp. 4-5) sees some benefits of corruption amongst which relevant here is economic development (capital formation, cutting red tape, and entrepreneurship and incentives). These factors in one way or another existed in the East-Asian states’ role of corruption analysis.   

Nature of the Corruption

In fact, the nature of corruption matters to evaluate its harmfulness or so.(Yun Sun (p.13) In profit sharing type of corruption non-state actors pay government officials to induce favorable policies concerning, for example, capital for investment, land for expansion, and export quotas. The rents accrue to the non-state sector rather than to the state. They amount to a share of the profits from private hands or a reallocation of private goods. This type of corruption may be the least harmful and could even lead to good social results. In China the profit sharing model was widespread during the early phases of development of township and village enterprises. In exchange for commercial privileges (access to favorable credits, supplies, marketing networks, tax rates), town-ship and village enterprises illicitly offered local officials profit shares.

When we compare the case of East Asia to that of other regions, to the extent, studies have been conducted; corruption has lead many developing countries such as those of Africa nations doom to failure.

Where the Money Goes

One factor in determining the effects of corruption is the destination of the corrupt money. If it is reinvested in the economy, capital losses will not be total. The likelihood of reinvestment in turn depends on the nature of extraction and the business environment. Thus, money from looting and rent seeking are more likely to leave the country or be consumed than gains from profit sharing. (Yan Sun, P.13)

In poor Africa the major problem is getting the money out of the country where it is milked from. It is not news that many despotic former-African leaders, such as Nigeria and former Zaire, have flown huge amounts of money to foreign banks like the Swiss Bank. (See J. S. Nye, p.4 for an example)

Another country corruption has taken to hell is Russia. We can understand from the reading of Yan Sun that opposite to the strong Chinese state which hosted widespread corruption but at the same time growing following the economic reform within existing party-state structure, Russia was heavily affected by corruption due to its weakened and divided political system as it reforms its economy under a new structure. (See foot note 5 of his article for more readings that show the negative consequences of corruption on growth)

For Russia the nature of corruption also mattered. Rent seeking had more adverse effect in Russia than in China. Looting, such as the embezzlement and theft of public resources, is the most harmful type of corruption with no benefits in itself. Its negative effects range from fiscal deprivation to distorted income distribution. Looting was the dominant form of corruption in Russia. (Yan Sun, pp. 11-12)

Another region is India where, according to Mushtaq Kahn (p.1), there is a general perception that poverty must have something to do with the corruption of its politicians despite the small amount involved.

Araya Kebede Araya, LL B., MA, LL. M (PROLAW)

Lecturer in Law, Mekelle University, College of Law and Governance

Ethiopia, Mekelle - Adi Haqi Campus

Cell phone: +39 3896872473 (Rome, Italy), +251 923 771883 (Ethiopia)

E-mail: araya57k@gmail.com, aaraya@luc.edu

Blog: http://lawfordevelopment.blogspot.com/

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Big China: rising threat, rising peace?

By Araya Kebede Araya*

Big China: rising threat, rising peace?

Hegemonic Stability theorists such as Robert Gilpin (cited in Friedberg, P.1) note that rapid changes are dangerous. Periods of accelerated economic and technological development typically result in dramatic shifts in the international distribution of military power, and these can raise the risks of misperception, mutual fears, miscalculation and confrontation.

International systems in which one state in particular is rising very rapidly are especially prone to upheaval. Friedberg reasoned out that swiftly ascending powers like China invariably challenge the legitimacy of treaties, territorial settlements and hierarchies of prestige and deference put in place when they were relatively weak. Neighboring countries see the situation as disruptive and threatening.

For K.N Waltz (pp. 881-909) and J. Mearsheimer (pp.13-18) along with many Realists, China’s rise is a threat as it is joining the multipolar system in which there are many strong states that make the region prone to instability. The end of the Cold War accelerates the emergence of a truly multipolar system, with a cluster of ‘big powers (including Japan, China, India, Russia and, to the extent that it remains engaged, the US) and an assortment of others with substantial wealth, technological competence and potential military power. If the realists are right, commented Friedberg (p.2), it may be difficult to achieve a stable, lasting peace in a multipolar Asia.

Some American activities in the East Asia region and their misperception (hence constructivism) against China shows American’s see China’s rise as a threat. As per D. Shambaugh (pp.52-79) and A.S. Whiting (pp. 596-615), the US is taking steps that many Chinese perceive to be aimed at containing their country’s rising power. These include intervening in the 1996 Taiwan Straight crisis, strengthening the alliance with Japan and discussing the possibility of developing a wide-ranging-theatre-missile-defence system. American decision makers regard these measures as defensive, and as response to increasing Chinese power and assertiveness. Chinese strategists see American actions as aggressive, and may well respond in ways that serve only to heighten American anxieties. The reason behind America’s actions and misperceptions is they see China’s rise as a threat.     

Even from Democratic Peace theory perspective, the undemocratic China’s rise is considered a threat. Liberal, Constructivist and Realist explanations all lead us to this conclusion. The culture, perceptions, and practices that permit compromise and the peaceful resolution of conflicts without the threat of violence within countries come to apply across national boundaries toward other democratic countries. (Russet, p.31) China does not fulfill this criterion. Democratic states, each with perfect information about the other’s constraints, will always settle their conflicts short of war. (B de Mesqita and Lalman, in Russet p….) But, China cannot. Therefore, from both sides explanations perspective, undemocratic China’s rise with no democratic behaviour, with no information about itself is a menace.

The wider circle of Asian powers includes a number of states that have not historically accommodated themselves to Chinese superiority and several, notably Russia and India, which have their own long traditions of playing balance-of-power politics. (Friedberg, p.6) Friedberg asserts that it cannot simply be assumed that these countries will fall willingly into an expanding Chinese orbit. On the contrary, it appears more likely that one or both will seek to balance China as its power grows. Moreover, taking the history that Japan has twice attacked China, the former may see the latter’s rise a threat. Still more countries like Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam that have stake on the South China Sea may not have positive feedback on China’s rise. Therefore, from this perspective we can say that Chinese rise is seen as a threat and not welcomed by the above mentioned countries and their likes due to several reasons.  

In favour of rising peace

Even from Realists, we can observe the opinion China as a rising peace. Considering that China is a rising hegemon and the USA is a hegemon one; we can buy K N. Waltz’s (pp. 881ff) argument of stable bipolar world as opposed to multipolar or unipolar. Therefore, in addition to its own peaceful rising behaviour, China’s rise will not be taken as a threat rather a potential force for a better peaceful and stable world by the time it equates itself with the present hegemon: creating equilibrium.   

China’s peaceful rise can also be argued from its own benefits side. Nations whose populations benefit from bilateral trade will have a powerful reason to remain at peace. The widening acceptance of market mechanisms and the deepening of regional economic ties should go along way towards counterbalancing any residual inclination towards conflict. Countries that are busy trading with one another are far less likely to go to war. (Richardson, Cossa and Khanna, in Friedberd p.3) What can we buy from this argument? China, more than any country else, knows how peaceful co-existence brings wealth and development via trade. If it threats other countries or others see its growth as a threat, China might lose more than it gains. China is happy the way it is going. China has no reason to change its direction to be a threat. So, other countries will also be deemed to consider it as is.

From R. Uriu’s (pp. 388-389) export-led peace perspective, which country is to see China as a threat? Uriu suggests that all of this tremendous focus on exports (and international economic exchange more broadly) has made East Asia into a zone of amity. China is here playing a leading actor.

Almost all countries from all corners of the world, even Japan, need China’s peaceful rise. Is the major debtor and trade partner – the U.S. – to see its main creditor’s rise as a threat? For one thing, China needs to be seen as peaceful force from US perspective for the formers huge stake in the latter one. For another thing, which part of China is really a threat to the U.S.? China’s economy though fast developing is far behind the U.S. Aside nuclear power, U.S.’ immense military might and overall science, technology and intelligence capabilities are unparalleled with any country including the PRC.    (The following website compares US-China military power - http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-12154991 accessed on February 9, 2011 )

Friedberg (p.3) summarizes how liberals place great faith on international institutions on. Despite the absence of strong and well rooted economic or security institution （like EU） in the region to grudge against China’s threat (if any), the emergence of the likes of APEC and ARF are of enormous help in providing regular communication, forum for discussion, negotiation, establish rules of acceptable behaviour, and promote cooperation between nations. If so, Chinas rise will not be seen as a threat in the region so far as the institution also guides China.

Its neighbours and other trade partners cannot see China’s rise a threat.  We can substantiate this argument seen from two perspectives.

One, economic interdependence and trade-expectation theory. D. Copeland’s (pp. 334ff), dictates that as partners heavily depend on peaceful, open and free trade and investment, the big China equally needs their partnership. The more it grows, the more it needs their partnership to satisfy its big ‘belly’. It’s going to trade with them not with the planet Mars. There is no way to think that tomorrow’s China is a threat to the region or the world.

B. Womack (p. 548) tells us that China’s asymmetrical relationship with its small neighbouring states, ironically, develops the credibility of its image as a peaceful, cooperative and inclusive partner. Even in the face of global rivalry, China’s best policy would be to continue its current directions by renewing commitments on the part of its leadership and developing an awareness of the importance of solidarity with less powerful states. (ibid)

Two, history will repeat it self: Asia’s past will be Asia’s future. (S. Huntington, p.238) Asians accept hierarchy and they regard a clear ordering of relations as the key to domestic and international tranquility.(D. Kang pp.167, 177ff; Mahbubani, p.117) Such attitudes may well have rooted in Confucianism. Whereas in Europe the dispersal of strength and the insistence on autonomy went hand in hand, in Asia a heavy concentration of capabilities has encouraged an inclination towards deference and an acceptance of Chinese hegemony. (Friedberg, p.5) In this connection, according to S. Huntington (p.234), for 2,000 years, East Asian international relations were Sinocentric. Most of the other states in the region have long traditions of either cooperating with or being subordinate to China. He suggests that similar patterns may well prevail in the future. With the rapid rise of Chinese power, he predicts the other Asian states will have to choose between power balanced to the price of conflict and peace secured at the price of hegemony. History, culture, and the realities strongly suggest that Asia will opt for peace and hegemony power.

D. Kang (p. 183) emphatically argues it is Chinese weakness not Chinese rise that has to be considered a threat esp. to the region.  Hence, (again) China rise is peaceful and a happy end for the region.

Base on preponderance as opposed to absolute reasoning, although the side arguing China’s rise as a threat has more than few grains of truth; generally speaking, I stand on the side of some leaders like US President Obama and Ethiopian PM. Meles side who are equally impressed by the other very strong side: CHINA’S RISE IS PEACEFUL!   

Araya Kebede Araya, LL B., MA, LL. M (PROLAW)

Lecturer in Law, Mekelle University, College of Law and Governance

Ethiopia, Mekelle - Adi Haqi Campus

Cell phone: +39 3896872473 (Rome, Italy), +251 923 771883 (Ethiopia)

E-mail: araya57k@gmail.com, aaraya@luc.edu

Blog: http://lawfordevelopment.blogspot.com/

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Chinese in Ethiopia: Localization

By Araya Kebede Araya*

Chinese in Ethiopia: Localization

* Chinese overall involvement seen from Africa, Ethiopia and my locality perspectives

Are Chinese aid, trade and investment considering regional and local political, economical and social situations? Or they are simply doing business in all areas in a similar fashion without considering varying local differences? Are they easily adaptive to existing environments? How about their life with he community they live? How about their aid to Africa – Ethiopia? Any conditions attached to their loans and aid?

Many argued that China was concerned not with disseminating ideologies rather it was determined to support Africa for the reason that they both belonged to the same group, colonized and of the third world entity.

China is not propagating the developing African countries to follow its ideology. This is one of the evidences not to say it is pursuing imperialism as imperialists want to see their values spread where ever they go. Rather, China is making business and establishing political, and cultural relationships taking respective nations values as it is and with out trying to impose its own but respecting its and others wide spread values, even it is not trying to sell developmental methods but leaving to respective countries to do so if they like and found it important to do so.

What is more, these developing countries believe they are benefiting. They are right as investment is more than aid and the former by far is advantaging than the latter. The imperialists were advancing their interest only.

As democracy and human rights require a reasonable degree of economic development, these African developing countries are as their infant stage of development. Naturally, one cannot expect human rights and democracies to spread easily. The decades long attempts are almost doomed to failure. So, may be China is right to ignore it and to follow its own route.

China is not endeavoring to convert the African countries to communism so as to befriend then. It is adhering to an accommodative policy; dealing with the countries with out interfering in their internal affairs.  No country, at present, follows Chinese socialism.

Generally, Chinese trade and investment path to Africa, Ethiopia so far does not show imperialism. It is, therefore, healthy to conclude that both are happy in the engagement and are benefiting although not necessarily at equal terms. The Chinese have created an alternative and relatively cheap market to Africans, countries and individuals. In one way or another, virtually all consumers seem happy by their existence. In other words, the markets the Chinese create are suitable to African countries and citizens as they are accommodative: the services and goods are cheap and relatively low quality but it is ok as majority of them cannot afford otherwise.  Although some of the products are low quality, due to their price many still continue to buy them with informed decision.

The Chinese government does not impose its ideology and does not attach any preconditions to its aid, investment, and any form of cooperation with African countries. Although all may not agree that the relations are perfect, at least it does not show they are repeating the history the West had been scrambling Africa for its resources under the guise of spreading ‘civilization’. They are not colonizing. The governments are willingly cooperating with the Chinese government and its companies for their benefit. The existing temporary trade imbalances are tolerable and expected.

Another point is that there are no major conflicts caused by their existence. Aside, minor misunderstandings and some expected labor disputes and similar civil and commercial cases; we cannot see major difficulties they encounter and they cause due to their settlement.

Chinese social life in Ethiopia: The VOA Amharic program found out that many Chinese enjoy their rest time in local bars drinking local drinks like tella, areqie, tej, etc. These are the places where do they entertain themselves.

The Chinese themselves are also opening Chinese restaurants in all over the country. They are introducing Chinese food and drinks. As the Chinese are influenced by the local customs, they in turn are playing a great role in spreading theirs, too. They are living the Ethiopian society’s life. Many want to continue living there. A legal expert of the Ethiopian Investment Agency told me in an interview that many Chinese ask for trade license.  However, only few of them do enter into the business they intended to be involved. Many of them are using the license as a pretext to live there a cheaper and happy life.  

How are Chinese viewed by the local community? There is no question that the two governments are very much friends. Even the community likes their existence there. They are active workers and create no problem aside few, expected and tolerable problems. The cultural and language problems are not taken as such big barriers. Some have started life there that they got children from Ethiopian women.

Some Ethiopian musicians sing praising Chinese working in Ethiopia. In addition to many local azmariwoch, (traditional singers that use public lyrics) a famous vocalist by the name Abdu Kiyar has a famous and widely accepted music entitled CHAI ‘ENA.  His music – Chay-Ena- (has two menings: one, in Amharic, it means have the skill and knowledge, don’t say I can’t. Second, Chay-ena=China). The music strongly acclaims Chinese attitude to work in sharp contrast to Ethiopians’ towards work habit, in general.  E.g., one music’s lyric can be translated as: while we were simply looking at the traffic jams for centuries, the Chinese came and built a flyover that resolves the very problem. It also praises how friendly they are with the Ethiopians, their attitude of working in collaboration to each other for their better future. In this connection, I learned from a VOA Special program on China-Ethiopia relations that there are also few Ethiopians who sing Chinese music in night clubs. 

These seemingly simple scenarios and simple cases taken together do make a case to interpret and understand the Chinese themselves’ life there and their widespread involvement in almost all walks of life in all corners of the country.

Araya Kebede Araya, LL B., MA, LL. M (PROLAW)

Lecturer in Law, Mekelle University, College of Law and Governance

Ethiopia, Mekelle - Adi Haqi Campus

Cell phone: +39 3896872473 (Rome, Italy), +251 923 771883 (Ethiopia)

E-mail: araya57k@gmail.com, aaraya@luc.edu

Blog: http://lawfordevelopment.blogspot.com/

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How far does DPT travel in explaining IRs: why democracies do not go to war against each other?

By Araya Kebede Araya*

How far does DPT travel in explaining IRs: why democracies do not go to war against each other?

Essay Argument: No International Relations (IR) theory has so far been able to provide sufficient causal mechanism to buttress Democratic Peace Theory’s (DPT) proposition: no two democracies go to war against each other.        

Basic assertion

There is wide-spread talk of “democratic peace.”  Presidents mention it all the time. For example, Bill Clinton, former President to the USA declared in 1994 that democracies do not attack each other. He meant that ultimately the best strategy to insure security and to build a durable peace is to support the advance of democracy elsewhere. (Owen, p.1) The data from Russett‘s book (p. 21), shows that over the 40 year period (and indeed in the years since 1986), there have been exactly ZERO wars between democracies! (Emphasis supplied) When democracies come into conflict with one another, they only rarely threaten to use force, because it is ‘illegitimate’ to do so. (Doyle, p.213, Russett, p.33)

By extension, it means democracy is viewed as an antidote that will prevent future wars or that if all countries are democratic, arguably, we can say war will cease to exist on the earth. Is it practical? Why is it really that democracies do not go to war? We need to think carefully and critically about WHY democracies do not fight each other. What are the competing theories? What is this thing democracy? What do we mean by war?

There are two general strands to the DPT’s logic: one, norms and culture; two, institutional constraint. The justification provided from liberal/constructivist, normative theories, side relies on democratic ideas, norms and culture. Russett (p.31) explains that culture, perceptions, and practices that permit compromise and the peaceful resolution of conflicts without the threat of violence within countries come to apply across national boundaries toward other democratic countries. Similarly, Owen (p.3) argues that liberal ideas cause liberal democracies to tend away from war with one another, and that the same ideas prod these states into war with illiberal states. Furthermore, he lists many theorists that wrote on this side on whom he relies for his many cases and propositions.

The above explanations go back to Immanuel Kant in the late 19^th Century and Woodrow Wilson at the start of the 20^th. It was part of the “liberal” and “idealist” optimism about possibilities for avoiding war.  It is also part of the modern constructivist view of the world, because it emphasizes the influence of socially-constructed norms like peaceful resolution of conflict.  Owen (p.5) taking Kant’s, Doyle’s, and Rummel’s idea explains this point that democracies believe it would be unjust or imprudent to fight one another. They practice the norm of compromise with each other that works so well within their own borders. Those in democracies come to feel that others in similar systems of government are constrained by the same norms. We do not seek to dominate democracies by force because we assume those in other democracies are similarly constrained and will not try to dominate us by force.

The problem is that this normative condition applies only between democracies.  It does not apply between fellow communist regimes or between fellow authoritarian regimes. It’s not a similar matter of “sharing a common identity” because we see fellow communists and fellow authoritarian regimes and fellow monarchies do fight each other.

Owen (pp.5-6) criticizes the normative theories group for not taking perceptions into account. Often states which today's researchers consider democratic did not consider each other democratic. Thus the anticipated normative check on war was frequently absent. Therefore, it is necessary for two democracies to be perceived each other as democracies.

The second strand attributes the absence of war between democracies to, structural theories or institutional constraint i.e., the restraining effects of public opinion or of the checks and balances embedded in a democratic state’s domestic political structure. Michael Doyle (pp.8-9), building on Immanuel Kant, explains that democratic governments are reluctant to go to war because they must answer to their citizens. The second point: states with executives, answerable to a selection (elected) body, with institutionalized political competition, and with decision making responsibility spread among multiple institutions, or individuals, should be more highly constrained and hence less likely to go to war.    

The Realist explanation, on this score, rests on the role of  information. Some Realists have come up with an explanation that fits with their assumptions about unitary actors, anarchy, and rationality. Two democratic states, each with perfect information about the other’s constraints, will always settle their conflicts short of war. (Bueno de Mesqita and Lalman, in Russett) What they emphasize is the role of democratic institutions in providing information about what states want and the risks they are willing to bear. It is because relations between democracies are so open, which debate on whether to go to war handled out in public that allows democracies to settle their conflicts short of war, through negotiations. In the words of Owen (p.5), chief executives in democracies must gain approval for war from cabinet members or legislatures, and ultimately from the electorate.

There are several IR scholars that have forwarded their views against part or all of the above DPT explanations. 

Mearsheimer (pp.3-), Melvin and Singer (pp.50-69), Rummel (pp.27-71), maintain that democracies are generally less prone to war. But, the reality that we do not really know the causal mechanism behind the democratic peace means we cannot be certain the peace is genuine. It may be an epiphenomenon, a by-product of other causal variables such as those suggested by Realist theories of international politics. 

Another challenge comes from David Spiro (pp.50-86). Lack of wars among democracies, even if true, is not surprising. Wars are so rare that random chance could account for the democratic peace, much as it could account for an absence of war among, say, states whose names begin with the letter K.

Scholars like Christopher Layne, make some outright objection to the statement that democracies do not go to war against each other: democracies have been at war with each other several times. More notable authors supporting this side mentioned by Owen (p.5) are Kenneth N. Waltz, Jack Vincent, Henry and Gowa. However, Christopher Layne (pp.12, 14) seems to argue harshly against the DPT. He along with others thinks institutional constraints do not explain the democratic peace. He challenges that if democratic public opinion really had the effect ascribed to it, democracies would be peaceful in their relations with all states, whether democratic or not. If citizens and policymakers of a democracy were especially sensitive to the human and material costs of war, that sensitivity should be evident whenever their state is on the verge of war, regardless of whether the adversary is democratic: the lives lost and the money spent will be the same. Nor is democratic public opinion, per se, an inhibitor of war. He continues his critique to the extent that even the check and balance mechanism, which is not necessarily exclusively owned by democracies, cannot explain democratic peace.

Moreover, he criticizes the norm and culture aspect of the theory. First, in a crisis, the more important the interests a democracy perceives to be at stake, the more likely that its policy will be shaped by realist imperatives rather than by democratic norms and culture. When vital interests are on the line, democracies should not be inhibited from using threats, ultimate, and big-stick diplomacy against, another democracy. Second, even in a crisis involving democracies states should be very attentive to strategic concerns, and the relative distribution of military capabilities, between them should crucially – perhaps decisively – affect their diplomacy. Third, broader geographical considerations pertaining to a state’s position in international politics should, if implicated, account significantly for the crisis’ outcome.  

Therefore, not only that the DPT lacks causal link but also the seemingly impressive but in fact, inconclusive, statistical evidence of the universal cases providing empirical support for the theory is small, and several cases of wars between democratic states are not counted for unpersuasive reasons.

Some have tried to balance the unbalanced attacks on the DPT. For example, Owen attempts to defend that the inadequacy of either democratic structures or norms alone to explain democratic peace does not prove that the democratic peace is spurious. It shows how illiberal leaders of democracies can make threats against one another and yet still be domestically constrained from attacking one another. It explains several supposed exceptions to the democratic peace by taking account of actors' perceptions; for example, the War of 1812 was fought at a time when almost no Americans considered England a democracy. (p.5)

  

Another problem arises from inside the theory itself. In that the controlling terms it employs – democracy and war - are inherently ambiguous. Although Owen has elaborated what liberal democracy means in his article, it still, is only one part of the story as long as all or many do not have a consensus on the practical definition of the term.

Conclusion

First, notwithstanding that numerous studies, mentioned above and many more, have identified democracy as a cause of democratic peace, none have yielded much meaningful, clear-cut, and nontrivial predictive power achievements that lie at the heart of scientifically identifying causality. (Michael Mousseau, p.1) Second, Russett’s statistics cannot provide justification but mere correlation. Third, the normative condition of norms and culture applies only between democracies but not developed to the extent of “sharing a common identity”. Fourth, Owen’s addition of perception has not filled the gap. Fifth, Christopher Layne’s crushing criticism against the two strands of the theory has not been tackled with. Therefore, we can conclude that despite its contribution in the effort of helping in explaining past, contemporary and possibly future international relations, DPT still suffers from providing, inter alia but most importantly, a strong and lasting causal mechanism that can successfully bridge its premises and conclusion, and clear cut definitions to terms that it heavily employs: democracy and war.  

Araya Kebede Araya, LL B., MA, LL. M (PROLAW)

Lecturer in Law, Mekelle University, College of Law and Governance

Ethiopia, Mekelle - Adi Haqi Campus

Cell phone: +39 3896872473 (Rome, Italy), +251 923 771883 (Ethiopia)

E-mail: araya57k@gmail.com, aaraya@luc.edu

Blog: http://lawfordevelopment.blogspot.com/

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